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Rosa Laugesen* 
In Low Volume Vehicle Technical Association Inc v Brett, the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
grappled with the rare issue of whether a person can waive their right to freedom of expression under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). The Court, responding in the affirmative, 
concluded that Mr Brett had waived this right. This article critiques that decision. While the Court 
was right to find that Mr Brett could waive his right to freedom of expression, it failed to scrutinise 
the waiver to ensure that this relinquishment of a protected right in fact reflected Mr Brett's free 
choice. Had the Court considered a different approach to analysing Mr Brett's waiver – at the prima 
facie breach stage, instead of under s 5 of the NZBORA – proper scrutiny would have been achieved. 
That approach would have ensured that Mr Brett was not so easily deprived of his right. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Writing in the year that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) was passed, DM 
Paciocco predicted the "inevitable" development of a waiver doctrine under the Act.1 Protected rights, 
in his view, can be, and should be, able to be waived by right-holders. However, he emphasised that 
the doctrine must be developed to recognise that "persons ought not to be deprived easily of 
  
*  Submitted for the LLB (Honours) degree, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 2019. I would 
like to express thanks to my supervisor, Professor Claudia Geiringer, for her guidance and advice. 
1  DM Paciocco "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Curial Cures for a Debilitated Bill" [1990] NZ 
Recent Law Review 353 at 380. 
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fundamental rights and freedoms".2 In the Court of Appeal's recent decision of Low Volume Vehicle 
Technical Association Inc v Brett,3 a waiver of the right to freedom of expression was considered by 
a New Zealand court for the second time.4 The Court held that the respondent, Mr Brett, could waive 
his right to freedom of expression, further developing the waiver doctrine in New Zealand as Paciocco 
had predicted. However, in doing so, the Court failed to heed Paciocco's directive, employing a waiver 
standard that deprived Mr Brett of his right to freedom of expression too easily. 
This article critiques the Court of Appeal's decision in Brett. First, it argues that the Court was 
correct to find that the right to freedom of expression can be waived: valid exercises of personal 
autonomy ought to be given effect to by the courts. However, beyond this finding, the Court's analysis 
of Mr Brett's waiver was unsatisfactory. After assuming that Mr Brett's waiver was best examined 
under s 5 of the NZBORA, the Court failed to sufficiently scrutinise the waiver. A more fit for purpose 
approach, ignored by the Court, would have been to consider Mr Brett's waiver when determining 
whether the right had been breached in the first place. Because this alternative approach is aligned 
with the theoretical underpinnings of waiver, use of it would have better equipped the Court to give 
Mr Brett's waiver the "aggressive" scrutiny required.5 Ultimately, upon proper interrogation of the 
alleged waiver under that approach, this article submits that the Court may not have reached the 
conclusion that Mr Brett had waived his right to freedom of expression. 
II THE DISPUTE IN LOW VOLUME VEHICLE TECHNICAL 
ASSOCIATION INC V BRETT 
A Facts 
The Low Volume Vehicle Technical Association (LVVTA) is an incorporated society that sets 
modified vehicle standards for low volume vehicles.6 Such vehicles are those manufactured in low 
volumes where the vehicle's construction may affect compliance with vehicle standards or safety 
requirements.7 National certifiers appointed by the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) apply 
LVVTA standards and issue low volume vehicle certifications. Mr Brett, the respondent in the case, 
was an approved certifier before his authorisation was revoked by the NZTA.8 
  
2  At 381. 
3  Low Volume Vehicle Technical Association Inc v Brett [2019] NZCA 67, [2019] 2 NZLR 808 [Brett (CA)]. 
4  See Christchurch International Airport Ltd v Christchurch City Council [1997] 1 NZLR 573 (HC). 
5  Paciocco, above n 1, at 381. 
6  Low Volume Vehicle Technical Association Inc "About Us: What Do We Do" <www.lvvta.org.nz>; and 
Brett (CA), above n 3, at [1]. 
7  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [3]. 
8  Low Volume Vehicle Technical Association Inc v Brett [2017] NZHC 2846, [2018] 2 NZLR 587 [Brett (HC)] 
at [1]. 
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The dispute between Mr Brett and the LVVTA arose when Mr Brett "embarked on a campaign of 
public criticism" against the LVVTA on his blog.9 After the LVVTA threatened legal action, the 
parties entered into a settlement agreement. The key terms of the agreement were cl 4, whereby the 
LVVTA agreed not to sue Mr Brett for defamation and cl 5, whereby Mr Brett agreed to remove 
certain material from his website and refrain from posting particular statements about the LVVTA in 
the future.10 
Nevertheless, Mr Brett continued to post offending material after the agreement was reached. The 
LVVTA then issued proceedings for defamation and for breach of the agreement. 
B The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Issue 
An issue under the NZBORA arose in regard to the LVVTA's breach of contract claim. If the 
settlement agreement was in breach of the NZBORA, as Mr Brett argued before the High Court and 
Court of Appeal, its enforceability by the courts would be limited. The right at issue was Mr Brett's 
right to freedom of expression, protected by s 14 of the NZBORA. Section 14 states: "[e]veryone has 
the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form." Relying on s 14, Mr Brett argued that cl 5 breached his right to 
freedom of expression by "seeking to prevent any expression of any kind concerning the LVVTA".11 
The clause at issue stated that Mr Brett agreed to:12 
(a) immediately remove, and desist from making any further such comments or statements in the future 
… that: 
(i) are incorrect; or 
(ii) are, or may be perceived to be, in any way defamatory toward LVVTA; or 
(iii) are, or may be perceived to be, in any way defamatory toward any person(s) employed by 
and/or associated with LVVTA; 
and 
(b) immediately remove, and desist from making any further such … statements in the future … that 
are not accompanied by clear and relevant documented evidence that supports the … statements 
being made; and 
… 
  
9  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [1]. 
10  Brett (HC), above n 8, at [19]. 
11  At [93]. 
12  Low Volume Vehicle Technical Association Inc and John Brett Settlement Agreement (5 June 2014) 
[Settlement Agreement], cl 5, as quoted in Brett (CA), above n 3, at [11] (emphasis added). 
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(d) prior to publishing any … statements about LVVTA … provide an LVVTA staff-member … with 
the opportunity to review the intended … statement(s), and he will either: 
(i) refrain from making the … statement if the LVVTA staff member can demonstrate that the … 
statement is incorrect; or 
(ii) in the case that the … statement is correct, allow the LVVTA staff member's written response 
to be provided immediately after the … statement … 
The High Court and Court of Appeal accepted that the NZBORA applied to the LVVTA's "act" 
of entering into the settlement agreement.13 This met the s 3(b) definition of an act done "by any 
person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on 
that person or body by or pursuant to law". The LVVTA was accordingly held to be a "s 3 body",14 
the consequence being that the agreement had to comply with the NZBORA in order to be 
enforceable.15 
However, even if the LVVTA's act of entering into the agreement had limited Mr Brett's right to 
freedom of expression, it would not automatically follow that it breached the NZBORA. Section 5 of 
the Act operates as a justification mechanism whereby s 3 bodies can establish that a prima facie 
interference with a given right is "justified". For the benchmark to be surpassed, the limit must be (a) 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society; and (b) prescribed by law.16 Only an 
unjustified limitation on Mr Brett's right to freedom of expression could render the contract, or parts 
of it, unenforceable. 
Mr Brett argued that cl 5 constituted an unjustified limitation on his right to freedom of expression 
and as a result, should be rendered unenforceable for inconsistency with the NZBORA.17 However, 
this argument gave rise to a separate issue in both courts. Had Mr Brett nevertheless waived his right 
to freedom of expression by agreeing to this clause? What did this mean for Mr Brett's claim that his 
right had been breached by the LVVTA? 
III HIGH COURT DECISION 
In the High Court, Palmer J considered the issue of waiver in one paragraph.18 His Honour raised 
the matter after already concluding that parts of cl 5 (sub-cls (a)(i), (d)(i) and (d)(ii)) should be voided 
  
13  Brett (HC), above n 8, at [97]; and Brett (CA), above n 3, at [27]–[29]. 
14  Paul Rishworth "Who does the Bill of Rights apply to?" in Essays on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1992) 19 at 24. 
15  Brett (HC), above n 8, at [107]; and Brett (CA), above n 3, at [33]. 
16  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 [NZBORA], s 5. 
17  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [2(a)] and [22]. 
18  Brett (HC), above n 8, at [106]. 
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for inconsistency with the NZBORA.19 Pointing out that the issue of waiver was not argued by either 
counsel before the Court, Palmer J hypothesised that perhaps "Mr Brett agreed to these restrictions so 
he was limiting his own rights".20 
His Honour first entertained the possibility that Mr Brett could waive his right to freedom of 
expression. But even assuming this right could be waived, Palmer J expressed hesitation about 
whether Mr Brett's waiver was valid. His Honour emphasised that, even if Mr Brett had agreed to cl 
5, "he did so under the threat of legal action and without legal advice".21 Notwithstanding this, his 
Honour did not appear convinced that this right could be waived. He relied on the sole authority of 
Rommelfanger v Federal Republic of Germany in support of this belief, in which the European 
Commission of Human Rights rejected the argument that one's right to freedom of expression could 
be waived through an employment contract.22 
Ultimately, Palmer J concluded that "[i]f it were necessary to determine", he would have found 
that the Rommelfanger position applied: Mr Brett could not waive his right to freedom of expression 
through the agreement.23 It is unclear why his Honour did not believe that the issue was "necessary 
to determine". The most likely explanation, is that Palmer J simply raised this argument as an 
afterthought. Indeed, his Honour had already reached a position on the NZBORA issue, finding that 
parts of cl 5 were void. As the argument was not advanced by either counsel, Palmer J may have 
determined that merely raising the possibility of waiver was sufficient, as opposed to reaching a 
definitive finding on it. 
IV COURT OF APPEAL DECISION 
Palmer J in the High Court considered that the issue of waiver was unnecessary to determine. The 
Court of Appeal squarely addressed it. Importantly, the Court found that the right to freedom of 
expression can be waived through contract. Unlike Palmer J, who expressed hesitation at this notion, 
the Court of Appeal readily accepted it, making three arguments in support of this conclusion. 
First, the Court noted that the practice of individuals self-limiting their rights in private law is 
ubiquitous.24 The Court used the example of A, who commits a tort against B. If A and B enter into 
a settlement agreement to avoid litigation, B relinquishes their right in tort and replaces it with a new 
right in contract. The Court argued that, not only is this practice common, but it is also in the public 
  
19  At [102]–[105] and [108]. 
20  At [106]. 
21  At [106]. 
22  Rommelfanger v Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 62 DR 151. 
23  Brett (HC), above n 8, at [106]. 
24  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [31]. 
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interest. In its view, when A and B elect to settle – thereby waiving any right to a remedy – civil 
society benefits from this avoidance of potentially "protracted and destructive" litigation.25 
Secondly, the Court found that waivers in a NZBORA context are a corollary of the fact that rights 
are not absolute;26 rights can be permissibly limited, provided that the limits are justified under s 5.27 
Finally, the Court noted that "protected rights may be lawfully qualified … where the actor 
perceives a benefit may be obtained from an exchange of rights".28 The Court gave the example of 
the NZBORA s 23(4) right not to make a statement on arrest, noting that many people, when arrested, 
prefer to waive this right and give an account of their actions, as opposed to remaining silent. 
Extracting further examples from Tipping J's judgment in Christchurch International Airport Ltd v 
Christchurch City Council,29 the only other New Zealand case to consider a s 14 waiver, the Court 
noted that right-holders frequently surrender the s 23(1)(b) right to legal advice and the s 14 right to 
freedom of expression because it is advantageous to do so.30 
While accepting that the right to freedom of expression can be waived through contract, the Court 
of Appeal emphasised that any right-limiting act must be justified under s 5 of the NZBORA.31 This 
requires that the limitation is prescribed by law and can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. The Court noted that the beneficial worth of "upholding compromises to 
litigation" is important to this inquiry, as well as whether consent was obtained by "unconscionable 
means".32 
Importantly, the Court found that a contractual abrogation is prescribed by law. This hurdle 
requires that the right-limiting act or omission is not only authorised by law, but that this law is 
"adequately accessible to the public" and "formulated with sufficient precision" as to guide citizens' 
conduct.33 While noting that this particular application of the prescribed by law requirement had not 
  
25  At [31]. 
26  At [34]. 
27  NZBORA, s 5. 
28  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [35]. 
29  Christchurch International Airport Ltd, above n 4, at 583 per Tipping J. 
30  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [35]. 
31  At [38]. 
32  At [38]. 
33  Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2015) at [6.12.2]. See also Grant Huscroft "Reasonable limitations on rights and freedoms" in 
The Bill of Rights Act – getting the basics right (New Zealand Law Society seminar, 2001) 59 at 61. 
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been "directly considered by New Zealand courts before",34 the Court found that a contractual 
abrogation is prescribed by law to the extent that the agreement is otherwise enforceable at common 
law.35 In reaching this conclusion, the Court appeared to be persuaded by its earlier finding that one 
should be able to waive one's right to freedom of expression. It stated that to find otherwise – that a 
contractual abrogation falls short of this s 5 requirement, rendering it unenforceable – would be 
"perverse".36 "This is the kind of right which people should … be allowed to surrender 'for what they 
see as their own advantage'", the Court emphasised.37 
Clause 5 was also held to be demonstrably justified, clearing the remaining hurdle of s 5. The 
Court of Appeal disagreed with Palmer J's finding that sub-cls (a)(i), (d)(i) and (d)(ii) constituted an 
unjustified limitation on Mr Brett's right to freedom of expression.38 To the contrary, the Court found 
that cl 5 was lawful and the agreement was valid in its entirety.39 Relying on observations made by 
Tipping J in Christchurch International Airport Ltd,40 the Court said that where the "limitation is 
entered into voluntarily for the surrendering party's perceived advantage, it is difficult to see why such 
a limitation … ought not to be effective".41 
Finally, the Court concluded that "had it been necessary to do so", it would not have found that 
parts of cl 5 lacked rational justification, as Palmer J had.42 In the Court's view, the sub-cls at issue 
constituted a "modest" concession on Mr Brett's right to freedom of expression.43 Moreover, the Court 
noted that Mr Brett had elected to enter into the settlement agreement, rather than submit to judicial 
determination where his legal position was "perilous".44 Finally, the Court noted that Mr Brett had 
voluntarily agreed to these obligations.45 
  
34  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [37] and n 48. 
35  At [37]. 
36  At [37]. 
37  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [37] (emphasis added), quoting Christchurch International Airport Ltd, above n 4, 
at 583. 
38  See Brett (HC), above n 8, at [102]–[105]. 
39  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [40]. 
40  Christchurch International Airport Ltd, above n 4, at 583. 
41  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [40]. 
42  At [41]. 
43  At [41(a) and (c)]. 
44  At [41]. 
45  At [41(c)]. 
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V CRITIQUE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL DECISION 
A Correct Conclusion That the Right Can Be Waived 
The Court of Appeal was right to conclude that one should be able to contract out of one's right 
to freedom of expression; this was a welcome development in the waiver doctrine. The reasons given 
by the Court itself in support of this finding were, this article suggests, entirely correct. However, a 
further argument, not directly addressed by the Court, can also be made in support of the availability 
of waiver: that by recognising waivers, the courts give effect to the value of autonomy that underpins 
a liberal democracy. 
First, the Court was correct to suggest that recognising waivers gives effect to the "beneficial 
worth in a civil society of upholding compromises to litigation".46 At a societal level, settlement 
agreements serve the interests of the administration of justice by freeing court resources for other 
cases.47 Moreover, at an individual level, these agreements also serve the interests of private 
litigants.48 As Lord Bingham said:49 
The law loves a compromise. … A party who settles foregoes the chance of total victory, but avoids the 
anxiety, risk, uncertainty and expenditure of time which is inherent in almost any contested action, and 
escapes the danger of total defeat. 
This was indeed the case for Mr Brett who, as the Court observed, elected to enter into a settlement 
agreement rather than "submit to judicial determination".50 Brett, whose "legal position was perilous" 
and whose "pocket was at significant risk" chose not to defend his actions "with all the risk that 
brought with it", the Court said.51 
If right-limiting settlement agreements are rendered unenforceable by the courts because they 
breach the NZBORA, this undermines the benefit in preserving compromises to litigation. By 
recognising waivers, however, a finding of unenforceability is less likely. This promotes the public 
interest served by maintaining compromises to litigation. 
  
46  At [38]. 
47  Mionis v Democratic Press SA [2017] EWCA Civ 1194, [2018] QB 662 at [89]; and Judith A McMorrow 
"Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private Rights of Action" (1989) 34 Vill L Rev 429 at 459. 
48  Mionis, above n 47, at [89]. 
49  David Foskett The Law and Practice of Compromise (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Toronto, 1996) at xi, as 
quoted in Mionis, above n 47, at [88]. 
50  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [32]. 
51  At [41]. 
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The Court was also correct to suggest that people ought to be able to surrender their right "for 
what they see as their own advantage".52 The Court noted that Tipping J in Christchurch International 
Airport Ltd argued this, saying that:53 
There is nothing inherently inimical in surrendering … one's freedom of expression. Commercial 
documents and settlements of litigation frequently contain clauses whereby each party … surrenders 
his/her freedom of expression. They do so because the parties regard it as commercially advantageous … 
to do so. 
The Court of Appeal and Tipping J both made a common sense argument: why should the courts 
prevent an individual from waiving their right to freedom of expression if it is to their own advantage? 
Indeed, in Brett, the Court highlighted the "manifest" benefits of Mr Brett electing to agree to the 
right-limiting terms, rather than face costly litigation.54 As Jørgan Aall puts it, "[i]n a liberal 
democracy … it seems strange if the individual were to be barred from utilising such advantages 
stemming from his human rights."55 
Therefore, as can be seen, the Court put forward a convincing case for recognising Mr Brett's 
waiver. However, it missed perhaps the most salient argument in favour of allowing right-holders to 
waive their right to freedom of expression: autonomy. Autonomy is a value that underpins liberal 
society. In essence, autonomy is about individual choice.56 At its extreme, liberal theory argues that 
the government ought to respect all exercises of autonomy so long as they are not exercised to infringe 
upon the autonomy of others.57 
Scholars have made a number of connections between autonomy and human rights theory. HLA 
Hart submitted that there is a fundamental connection between rights and agency.58 In his view, all 
rights presuppose the right to liberty and the capacity for personal choice.59 As a corollary, it is up to 
  
52  Christchurch International Airport Ltd, above n 4, at 585, as quoted in Brett (CA), above n 3, at [37]. 
53  Christchurch International Airport Ltd, above n 4, at 585, as quoted in Brett (CA), above n 3, at [35] (emphasis 
added). 
54  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [40]–[41]. 
55  Jørgen Aall Waiver of Human Rights: Setting the Scene (Part I/III) (2010) 28 NJHR 300 at 302. 
56  Alan Young "'Not Waving But Drowning': A Look at Waiver and Collective Constitutional Rights in the 
Criminal Process" (1989) 53 Sask L Rev 47 at 51. 
57  Jessica Wilen Berg "Understanding Waiver" (2003) 40 Hous LR 281 at 289. See also John Stuart Mill On 
Liberty (2nd ed, Ticknor and Fields, Boston, 1863) at 48. 
58  HLA Hart "Are There Any Natural Rights?" (1955) 64 The Philosophical Review 175. 
59  Aall, above n 55, at 302. 
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the individual to determine how and whether to exercise their rights.60 Similarly, Immanuel Kant 
contended that the purpose of rights is to allow individuals to freely pursue their own ends.61 
If autonomy presupposes that individuals can choose how to exercise their rights, this must include 
the choice to relinquish or waive that right.62 The theoretical groundings of waiver are therefore 
deeply rooted in autonomy. Tipping J in Christchurch International Airport Ltd noted the connection 
between autonomy and waiver when he stated:63 
The Bill of Rights gives individual citizens particular rights and freedoms. It would seem somewhat 
contradictory to say that such rights and freedoms may not be given up for what the person concerned 
regards as valid reasons. The concept of freedom presupposes not only that you are free to enforce your 
right but that you are free not to enforce it and to waive it, if you choose to do so. 
In order to respect a right-holder's autonomy, the courts should therefore recognise the exercise 
of autonomy manifested when a right-holder decides to waive a given right.64 
Nevertheless, scholars of Alan Young's persuasion reject the notion that individuals should be 
able to choose whether they receive the benefit of protected rights.65 Young argues that a right-
holder's decision to consent to an interference with their rights should not allow the state to abandon 
its constitutional boundaries. Waivers, he argues, harm other right-holders who have an interest in 
seeing the state stay within the constitutional scheme.66 Rights are not personally possessed by right-
holders, able to be commodified, but rather collective interests of citizens as a whole.67 Loukis 
Loucaides agrees, noting that:68 
  
60  Alex Gourevitch "Are Human Rights Liberal?" (2009) 8 Journal of Human Rights 301 at 321. 
61  Immanuel Kant "The Metaphysics of Morals" in Political Writings (2nd ed, Hans Reiss (ed) and HB Nisbet 
(translator), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970) 131 at 133; and Gourevitch, above n 60, at 321. 
62  Berg, above n 57, at 289. See also Christopher Harker "Consent Searches and Section 21 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990" (2011) 9 NZJPIL 137 at 161; Aall, above n 55, at 301; and Peter Hogg (ed) 
Constitutional Law of Canada (looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [37.3(b)]. 
63  Christchurch International Airport Ltd, above n 4, at 583 (emphasis added). 
64  Berg, above n 57, at 289. 
65  See Young, above n 56, at 102; Loukis G Loucaides "Questions of Fair Trial under the European Convention 
on Human Rights" (2003) 3 HRL Rev 27; and Gillian S Morris "Fundamental Rights: Exclusion by 
Agreement?" (2001) 30 ILJ 49. 
66  See Young, above n 56, at 102. 
67  At 102. See also Morris, above n 65, at 55. 
68  Loucaides, above n 65, at 48. 
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… human rights are conferred on the individual in the public interest in order to effectuate a policy of 
protecting him from the omnipotence of the State … They are not private personal rights that can be 
negotiated, compromised [or] waived … by the individual. 
The problem with Young and Loucaides' argument is twofold. First, while there is a public interest 
in seeing the state recognise rights generally, for example by legislating for and enforcing a bill of 
rights instrument, it does not follow that all rights are collective in nature.69 The better view is that 
every individual is endowed with a set of basic human rights which are inalienable to the extent that 
the right-holder wishes to hold onto them. However, if a right-holder decides to waive a right in self-
interest, this is a personal choice that ought to be respected by the courts. After all, it is arguable that 
waiving one's right to freedom of expression affects no-one directly beyond the right-holder; the only 
impact is on that individual's right.70 If this is the case, why should that individual be prohibited from 
foregoing the benefit of the right? In the words of leading constitutional scholar Peter Hogg, the right 
is for the benefit of the individual who chooses to waive it.71 
Moreover, the argument that the right to freedom of expression should not be waived because it 
is inalienable is hypocritical. A key rationale underpinning this right is the notion of human self-
fulfilment: that expression holds intrinsic value in and of itself. By seeking, receiving and imparting 
information and opinions, this helps right-holders to develop an understanding of who they are and to 
reach their full potential.72 This rationale is predicated on autonomy – on an individual's ability to 
achieve self-actualisation through any kind of expression, "however unpopular, distasteful or contrary 
to the mainstream" the content of that expression is.73 If we regard the right to freedom of expression 
as sacred and, by implication, the concept of autonomy on which its self-fulfilment rationale depends, 
similar exercises of autonomy should also be regarded as sacred. The personal autonomy promoted 
by expression is not that distinct from the autonomy exercised to waive that same right. Hogg is right 
to point out that "most rights are intended to protect the … autonomy of the individual, and the practice 
of waiver is consistent with that purpose".74 This article submits that this is the better view. 
  
69  See Hogg, above n 62, at [37.3(b)]. 
70  Compare Morris, above n 65, at 55. 
71  See Hogg, above n 62, at [37.3(b)]. 
72  Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [13.6.4]; and R v Sharpe [2001] 1 SCR 45 at [141] per L'Heureux-Dubé, 
Gonthier and Bastarache JJ. 
73  Irwin Toy Ltd v Québec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927 at [41], as quoted in R v Sharpe, above n 72, 
at [145]. See also Susan Easton "Autonomy and the Free Speech Principle" (1995) 12 J Applied Phil 27. 
74  Hogg, above n 62, at [37.3(b)]. See also Harker, above n 62, at 161. 
90 (2020) 51 VUWLR 
B Approach to Waiver Was Not Fit for Purpose 
The Court was right to find that one should be able to waive one's right to freedom of expression, 
but its treatment of waiver beyond this conclusion was inadequate. After assuming that Mr Brett's 
waiver should be considered under s 5 of the NZBORA, the Court then failed to properly apply a s 5 
analysis, inhibiting its ability to rigorously scrutinise the waiver. There are arguments in support of a 
s 5-centred analysis, or the "ad hoc balancing" approach as labelled by its proponents. However, this 
article ultimately concludes that when it comes to considering a waiver, a s 5 approach is not fit for 
purpose. 
1 The s 5 approach 
Brett appears to be the first case to consider a waiver of the right to freedom of expression in over 
20 years.75 With this, the Court of Appeal was given a rare opportunity to clarify how s 14 waivers 
fit into the NZBORA framework. 
The basic framework for considering a claim under the NZBORA is twofold. First, the right-
holder must show that there has been a "prima facie" limitation of a protected right.76 This involves a 
determination of the scope of the right. If a prima facie breach is established, the second step is to ask 
whether this limitation is justified under s 5.77 The onus of establishing this shifts to the party seeking 
to limit the right – the s 3 body.78 Only if the limit cannot be demonstrably justified will there be a 
breach of the NZBORA. 
An important issue is how waivers interact with this framework. If evidence comes before the 
court that a right-holder consented to the interference at issue, how should this be taken into account? 
What impact does a right-holder's consent have on their NZBORA claim against the s 3 body? 
There are two different approaches that can be taken to waivers, each interacting with the 
NZBORA framework differently. The first approach considers waiver at the prima facie breach stage. 
When there is evidence of waiver before the court, a burden is placed on the s 3 body to establish that 
the right-holder's waiver was valid.79 To be valid, the court must be satisfied that the waiver was 
  
75  See Christchurch International Airport Ltd, above n 4. 
76  Paul Rishworth "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: The First Fifteen Months" in Essays on the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1992) 7 at 19; and Butler and Butler, 
above n 33, at [6.6.7]. 
77  Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [6.6.6]. 
78  At [6.6.7]. See also Paul Rishworth "How to Interpret and Apply the Bill of Rights" in The Bill of Rights Act 
– getting the basics right (New Zealand Law Society seminar, 2001) 12. 
79  Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [20.11.35]. 
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informed, unequivocal and voluntary.80 If the standard is met – and there has been a valid waiver – 
there is no interference with the right81 and the right-holder's claim under the NZBORA automatically 
fails. This approach reflects that taken by the courts in respect of waivers of certain procedural rights 
contained in the NZBORA, for example the right to consult and instruct a lawyer in s 23(1)(b)82 and 
the right to refrain from making a statement in s 23(4).83 
By comparison, the second approach considers waiver at the s 5 stage. Even if there is evidence 
of waiver before the court, there will still be a prima facie interference with the right which must be 
justified under s 5. Along with other matters of justification relevant to s 5, the waiver is weighed up 
in determining the reasonableness of the interference.84 
Both approaches recognise that waivers must be subjected to scrutiny. After all, waivers assert 
that a right-holder has relinquished a given right, hindering their ability to rely on its protection.85 
This may persuade a court to find that the s 3 body has limited the right justifiably (under the s 5 
approach), or perhaps not at all (under the prima facie breach approach). Section 3 bodies should not 
be able to abandon their constitutional commitments to respecting rights unless and until a court is 
satisfied that the waiver does in fact reflect the right-holder's free choice.86 Whereas the prima facie 
breach approach scrutinises the waiver by applying the waiver standard, the s 5 approach achieves 
scrutiny by undertaking a broader reasonableness assessment of the limitation at issue. These 
safeguards give effect to Paciocco's notion that "persons ought not to be deprived easily of 
fundamental rights and freedoms".87 
The Court of Appeal adopted the s 5 approach.88 It did not consider the prima facie breach 
approach, nor did it provide any justification for why it elected its favoured approach. Instead, the 
Court appeared to assume that the two-stage methodology was fit for purpose for a case involving 
waiver. 
  
80  Lisiate v R [2011] NZCA 170 at [15]; and Police v Kohler [1993] 3 NZLR 129 (CA) at 133. See also Hogg, 
above n 62, at [37.3(a)]. 
81  Aall, above n 55, at 312; and Hogg, above n 62, at [37.3(a)]. 
82  See Police v Kohler, above n 80. For further discussion see Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [20.7.60]. 
83  See Lisiate v R, above n 80. For further discussion see Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [20.11.35]. 
84  Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] NZSC 46, [2008] 3 NZLR 774 at [21]. 
85  Johnson v Zerbst 304 US 458 (1938) at 464. See also Young, above n 56, at 50. 
86  See Michael E Tigar "Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights – Disquiet in the Citadel" (1970) 84 Harv 
L Rev 1 at 8. 
87  Paciocco, above n 1, at 381. 
88  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [38]. The Court stated at [38]: " … for a limitation by abrogation to be lawful, it 
must also pass muster as being demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society". 
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2 Support for the s 5 approach 
While the Court of Appeal did not provide reasons for adopting a s 5 approach to waiver, this 
approach accords with that taken by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Cropp v Judicial 
Committee.89 In that case, an issue arose about the effect of a right-holder's consent to a "search" 
within the meaning of s 21 of the NZBORA: the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure. The Court found that consent could not put a particular search outside the protection of s 21.90 
Instead, the Court believed that the fact of consent, and the quality of consent, are both matters relevant 
to assessing the reasonableness of a search.91 
It should be noted that the approach in Cropp is analogous, but not identical, to the Court's s 5 
approach in Brett. Section 21 of the NZBORA, the right to be free from "unreasonable search or 
seizure", is expressed in such a way that matters of justification are integral to its definition.92 
Accordingly, the reasonableness assessment is undertaken at the definitional stage, not under s 5. 
Regardless, the Supreme Court's approach in Cropp envisaged waiver as an important matter going 
to whether the search was reasonable, as opposed to whether there was a search or an interference in 
the first place. This is consistent with the Court's s 5 approach in Brett. 
In Cropp, the Supreme Court was reluctant to allow consent to put particular conduct outside the 
protection of the NZBORA. In the Court's view, all limitations on protected rights, whether consented 
to or not, ought to be scrutinised for justification. This concurs with the "ad hoc balancing" approach 
advocated by some scholars93 and judges.94 As opposed to the "definitional balancing" approach 
which involves reading limitations into rights at the definitional stage (the first stage of the NZBORA 
framework), the ad hoc balancing approach defines rights as broadly as possible. In doing so, the 
courts take an expansive approach to finding prima facie interferences with rights, thereby ensuring 
all "interferences" are scrutinised under s 5 (the second stage of the NZBORA framework). The Court 
of Appeal's determination that Mr Brett's right to freedom of expression had been interfered with, 
despite evidence of waiver, accords with this two-stage, s 5-centred approach. 
  
89  Cropp, above n 84. 
90  At [21]. 
91  At [21]. 
92  Section 21 (emphasis added). See Rishworth "How to Interpret and Apply the Bill of Rights", above n 78, at 
15. 
93  See for example Rishworth "How to Interpret and Apply the Bill of Rights", above n 78, at 14; Rishworth 
"The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: The First Fifteen Months", above n 76, at 19; and Butler and 
Butler, above n 33, at [6.6.6]. 
94  See for example Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) per Tipping J; and Ministry of Health 
v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456. 
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Andrew Butler and Petra Butler make three arguments in favour of the two-stage ad hoc balancing 
approach.95 First, it is consistent with a purposive reading of the NZBORA that locates s 5 in a 
separate Part from the protected rights and freedoms.96 Secondly, it better allocates the burden of 
proof, with the onus shifting to the s 3 body at the second stage to demonstrate that the limitation is 
justified under s 5.97 Thirdly, and most importantly, it "ensures clearer, more transparent analysis".98 
By dealing with matters of justification under s 5, each interference with a right is "scrutinised with 
an eye to the detail of the particular right in issue, the scheme impugned and the context disclosed by 
the particular case".99 
The preferred method for determining whether the standard set by s 5 has been passed – that a 
limitation is "reasonable" and can be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"100 – is 
to apply a modified version of the R v Oakes test,101 a framework established by the Canadian 
Supreme Court. The Oakes test emphasises rationality and proportionality between the purpose of the 
right-limiting act or omission and the limitation itself.102 Tipping J formulated the test in Hansen v R 
as:103 
(a) does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify curtailment of the right 
or freedom? 
(b) (i) is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose? 
(ii)   does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary 
for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
(iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective? 
Ultimately, proponents of the two-stage approach argue that it allows for the "[v]ital questions of 
justification" to be explored in NZBORA claims.104 Perhaps, then, the Court of Appeal believed that 
considering Mr Brett's waiver under s 5 would give it maximum rigour and scrutiny. 
  
95  Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [6.6.6]–[6.6.10]. 
96  At [6.6.6]. 
97  At [6.6.7]. 
98  At [6.6.8]. 
99  At [6.6.8]. 
100  NZBORA, s 5. 
101  R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
102  Huscroft, above n 33, at 65. 
103  Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [104]. 
104  Rishworth "How to Interpret and Apply the Bill of Rights", above n 78, at 13. 
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3 The Court's misapplication of the s 5 approach 
If the Court of Appeal's intention behind employing a two-stage approach – or a "s 5 approach" – 
was to give the waiver maximum scrutiny, it was an intention on which it completely failed to deliver. 
In practice, the Court misapplied s 5, failing to subject Mr Brett's waiver to any rigour. This 
demonstrated that when there is evidence of waiver before a court, a s 5 approach is not fit for purpose. 
The overarching problem with the Court's analysis is that when it came to the point, it failed to 
meaningfully engage with s 5. Correctly applied, s 5 requires the court to determine that first, the 
limitation is prescribed by law and secondly, that it is "reasonable" and "demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society". As discussed earlier, courts often elect to adopt the Oakes test to 
determine whether the second hurdle of s 5 has been met. For a case like Brett, it would be expected 
that matters such as the quality of Mr Brett's consent and the public interest in upholding settlement 
agreements would be scrutinised and balanced under Oakes in order to reach a finding of whether the 
limitation was justified.105 The Court itself noted that these contextual factors would be relevant to 
determining whether the contractual abrogation was lawful.106 Only if the limitation passes the 
requirements of s 5,107 the Court emphasised, can a determination be reached that it was justified.108 
However despite that theoretical acknowledgement of the centrality of s 5, when it came to it, the 
Court's approach barely resembled a conventional s 5 inquiry; the Court concluded that the limitation 
was prescribed by law, but it neglected to engage, more than in passing, with whether it was 
demonstrably justified. 
In a short paragraph, the Court outlined the crux of its analysis under s 5:109 
The limitations here were entered voluntarily by Mr Brett. The benefits to him were manifest. Differing 
from the [High Court] Judge, we conclude that the contractual abrogation of rights was lawful, and the 
agreement was valid in its entirety. 
Thus, given Mr Brett's waiver was effective,110 the Court concluded that the limitation on his right 
was lawful and the agreement was valid.111 Contrary to the thrust of s 5, the Court's finding of 
  
105  Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [6.6.8]. See also Rishworth "How to Interpret and Apply the Bill of Rights", 
above n 78, at 13. 
106  Brett (CA), above n 3, at [38]. 
107  Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [6.3.1]. 
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n 3, at [38]. 
109  At [40]. 
110  At [40]. 
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lawfulness was not based on an overt analysis that the limitation was justified, rather that Mr Brett's 
waiver was effective. Here, the Court abandoned its own s 5 approach, failing to discuss matters of 
reasonableness, justification or proportionality, and neglecting to apply Oakes, the preferred test for 
whether a limitation is justified. The contextual matters that the Court itself said would be relevant 
under s 5 – such as the quality of Mr Brett's consent and the public interest attached to upholding 
settlement agreements – were left untouched.112 Ultimately, instead of the "clear" and "transparent" 
analysis promised by s 5 proponents,113 the Court concluded that the limitation on Mr Brett's right to 
freedom of expression was lawful without the s 5 assessment to back it up. 
Having just concluded that the limitation on Mr Brett's right was lawful, the Court of Appeal then 
stated that, "had it been necessary to do so", it would not have concluded, as Palmer J had, that parts 
of cl 5 lacked rational justification.114 This assertion is baffling. The Court just purported to subject 
the settlement agreement – and its alleged limitation contained therein – to s 5. Indeed, the Court had 
said a few paragraphs before that "for a limitation by abrogation to be lawful, it must also pass muster 
as being demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".115 In order to be consistent with its 
own stated principles, the Court's finding that the limitation was lawful, therefore, must have been 
based on a finding that it was justified, even if this was not overt. Why then would the Court say that 
"had it been necessary to do so" it would not have concluded that parts of cl 5 lack justification. 
Then apparently applying s 5 for the second time, the Court gave reasons why the limitations on 
Mr Brett's right in cl 5 were justified. However, this time its analysis was stated in the hypothetical. 
Given that the Court had already reached a conclusion that the agreement was lawful, this additional 
consideration of s 5 is under the proviso of "had it been necessary to do so".116 In this hypothetical 
analysis, the Court noted that the impact on Mr Brett's right to freedom of expression was "modest", 
that the LVVTA's response was "proportionate" and that Mr Brett had voluntarily assumed the 
obligations.117 Accordingly, "had it been necessary", the Court would have concluded that the 
limitations on Mr Brett's right contained in cl 5 were justified.118 Not only is it strange that the Court 
elected to apply s 5 twice, but even more bewildering is that its second analysis was far more akin to 
what would be expected from an assessment under s 5, with consideration given to notions of 
  
112  At [38]. 
113  Butler and Butler, above n 33, at [6.6.8]. 
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proportionality, justification and reasonableness. Far less rigorous and adequate was the Court's earlier 
reasoning for why the limitation of Mr Brett's right was lawful and the agreement was valid. 
The Court's analysis is troubling. After first asserting that a limitation must pass muster under s 5 
to be lawful,119 the Court failed to follow its own directive to properly apply s 5. Only under the 
proviso "had it been necessary to do so", does the Court properly engage with it. Not only did this 
demonstrate poor judicial reasoning but, more importantly, it led to a gap in the Court's analysis. In 
addition to neglecting to subject the waiver to scrutiny under s 5, the Court did not subject it to the 
waiver standard either. Indeed, the Court's finding that Mr Brett's waiver was effective is based on 
unsatisfactory reasoning that it was entered into "voluntarily" and for his "perceived advantage".120 
There is no application of the "informed, unequivocal and voluntary" criteria. Ultimately, Brett shows 
that where there is evidence of waiver before the court, a s 5 approach is not fit for purpose.  
C Failure to Consider a Better Approach 
The Court of Appeal's decision in Brett demonstrated that considering waiver under s 5 – or a "s 
5 approach" – is not fit for purpose. This article submits that a better approach would have been to 
consider Mr Brett's waiver earlier, when determining whether his right had been breached. Introduced 
above, a "prima facie breach approach" scrutinises the waiver at the first stage of the NZBORA 
framework, as opposed to at the second stage (under s 5). On this approach, if a court is satisfied that 
a waiver was valid – ie a right-holder's act of relinquishing a right was informed, clear and voluntary 
– it will deem that there is no interference with the right. Without a prima facie breach to rely upon, 
the right-holder's claim under the NZBORA will automatically fail. 
The advantage of adopting a prima facie breach approach to waiver, overlooked by the Court of 
Appeal in Brett when it elected a s 5 approach, is that it is congruent with the theoretical basis of 
waiver. As a result, this alternative approach directs a court's analysis to the matters most pertinent 
when the issue of waiver is before a court, unlike the s 5 approach which misdirected the Court's 
analysis in Brett. In doing so, the prima facie breach approach equips a court to properly scrutinise a 
waiver. Unlike the Court's s 5 approach in Brett which was misdirected and thus led to gaps in the 
Court's analysis, the prima facie breach approach would have allowed the Court to fully interrogate 
Mr Brett's waiver. As a result, it is submitted, perhaps the Court would not have reached the same 
conclusion that Mr Brett had waived his right to freedom of expression. 
1 Congruence with conceptual foundations of waiver 
What makes the prima facie breach approach the most fit for purpose when dealing with a waiver 
is its congruence with waiver's theoretical underpinnings. This article submits that it was a lack of 
alignment with the conceptual basis of waiver which led the Court of Appeal's s 5 approach in Brett 
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to be so futile. Any approach to waiver which ignores these conceptual underpinnings will be 
inevitably misdirected, and accordingly not fit for purpose.  
As submitted in earlier, the conceptual basis of waiver is autonomy. If all rights presuppose that 
individuals possess the autonomy to choose how a right will be exercised, that same respect for 
autonomy should extend to a right-holder's choice to waive that right.121  
In order to give full effect to the autonomy interest inherent in waiver, it is not sufficient that a 
court merely recognise this act of relinquishment. Rather, that court must also find that because the 
right-holder has waived the right, there can be no possible interference with it by the s 3 body. Hogg 
uses the example of an individual waiving their right to a lawyer: if this right is waived, then the police 
are free to question the accused without infringing that right.122 This is because in exercising his or 
her autonomy to relinquish a given right, the right-holder has thereby given up the protection that it 
affords.123 
Nevertheless, the s 5 approach, adopted by the Court in Brett, disregarded this conceptual basis 
of waiver. While the Court gave effect to the notion of autonomy by recognising Mr Brett's waiver in 
the first place, it failed to extend this recognition when it went on to analyse the waiver. By assuming 
that even if Mr Brett had waived his right, it had still been interfered with by the LVVTA and required 
justification under s 5, the Court disregarded the personal autonomy inherent in the waiver: that Mr 
Brett wished to relinquish any protection afforded by that right.124 
The better view, conceptually congruent with waiver's theoretical grounding in autonomy, would 
have been to adopt the prima facie breach approach. There, if a court establishes that a right-holder's 
waiver was valid, there is no interference with the right and the right-holder's claim under the 
NZBORA automatically fails. Unlike the Court of Appeal's approach, the claim does not proceed to 
s 5 where the reasonableness, proportionality and justification of the interference is discussed. There 
is no discussion of Oakes and its inquiries, because the approach acknowledges that these are no 
longer the pertinent issues. The nature of the NZBORA claim has changed and any attention given to 
matters of justification, above and beyond whether the waiver was valid, will misdirect a court. It is 
both conceptually incoherent – as well as dismissive of a right-holder's exercise of autonomy – to say 
that, once an individual has relinquished their right, their right has been "interfered" with, requiring 
justification. The right-holder has simply lost the ability to rely on its protection.125 Accordingly, if a 
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court is to give full effect to the exercise of autonomy manifested in a waiver, the prima facie breach 
approach is the only one open. 
2 More rigorous scrutiny given to waiver 
Given that waivers have the power to deprive an individual of a protected right,126 a court ought 
to rigorously scrutinise any waiver that comes before it. However as a result of its misdirected s 5 
approach, the Court of Appeal failed to adequately scrutinise Mr Brett's waiver. While the Court did 
weigh up whether the waiver was voluntarily entered into and for Mr Brett's benefit, it did not apply 
any robust test for determining the waiver's validity, nor did it properly subject it to a s 5 assessment 
as it had proposed to do. 
Had the Court employed the informed, clear and voluntary standard under the prima facie breach 
approach, proper scrutiny would have been given to Mr Brett's waiver. This article seeks to 
demonstrate what this rigorous analysis of Mr Brett's waiver would have looked like under this 
approach. In particular it highlights how the Court ignored a critical component of the waiver standard 
– whether Mr Brett's waiver was informed – in the face of evidence that he entered into the agreement 
without legal advice. If the Court had considered all of the relevant evidence, it is submitted that it 
may have reached a different conclusion on Mr Brett's claim. 
The waiver standard ensures that before a waiver is declared effective by a court, "adequate 
procedural guarantees" are given to the right-holder, "whose choice must not be coerced, must be fully 
informed, and must be unequivocally expressed".127 Importantly, this standard displaces the role of s 
5: rigour is provided through the validity assessment alone. This runs counter to the perception that s 
5 is the cornerstone of scrutiny,128 but still provides for robust and careful analysis, just on different 
issues than a conventional s 5 assessment. The waiver standard acknowledges that when there is an 
issue of waiver before a court, the nature of the claim changes and matters of justification are no 
longer the pertinent issues. Instead, the focus shifts from whether the s 3 body's interference was 
justified, to whether the right-holder's act of contracting out was valid. A burden is thereby placed on 
the s 3 body to establish that the waiver was sufficiently informed, unequivocal and voluntary.129 
As outlined, there are three elements to the waiver standard: that the waiver was informed, 
unequivocal and voluntary.130 Crucially, the first requirement, that the waiver was informed, was not 
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applied by the Court of Appeal. "Informed" requires that the right-holder not only fully understands 
the right that they allegedly waived,131 but also that they have a full understanding of the implications 
of the waiver.132 When the waiver arises in the course of legal proceedings, whether the right-holder 
was adequately informed will often depend on whether they have legal representation because special 
knowledge of the area is usually presupposed.133 
Palmer J in the High Court observed that Mr Brett had waived his right to freedom of expression 
without legal advice.134 However the Court of Appeal did not mention this finding in determining 
that Mr Brett's waiver was effective. This raises an important question: whether a lack of legal advice 
would have rendered Mr Brett's waiver invalid. While the absence of legal advice may suggest a 
waiver was uninformed, this article submits that, if a court is nonetheless satisfied that the right-holder 
sufficiently understood the right waived and the consequences of waiving it, this presumption ought 
to be rebutted. 
Without a full picture of the circumstances in which Mr Brett allegedly waived his right, a 
definitive conclusion cannot be reached on whether, without legal advice, the waiver was sufficiently 
informed. However, without intending to be exhaustive, this article suggests a number of inquiries 
that a court should make, if this question was before it. How these matters are weighed and balanced 
will inevitably depend on a court's view of the evidence before it. 
First, a court ought to consider the complexity of the waiver. Arguably, if the contents of a right-
holder's waiver were straightforward, this may suggest that a decision to waive the right without legal 
advice was informed. It could be argued that Mr Brett's waiver was straightforward. Indeed, as Palmer 
J did in the High Court, the agreement could be succinctly summed up as: "the LVVTA agree[ing] 
not to sue Mr Brett for defamation in return for Mr Brett removing material from his website and not 
posting more".135 However from another point of view, Mr Brett's obligations under cl 5 of the 
agreement were complex.136 Indeed, sub-cl (a)(ii) required Mr Brett to remove statements from his 
website that "are, or may be perceived to be, in any way defamatory towards LVVTA", an obligation 
that would require a high comprehension of defamation law to attain compliance.137 Thus, maybe the 
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waiver was too complex for Mr Brett to understand what he consented to without legal advice, 
suggesting that his waiver was uninformed.138 
Another factor that may be relevant to whether the waiver was informed is the right-holder's 
education and legal understanding. Even if a court determines that the waiver was complex, if the 
right-holder's level of education or legal understanding is high, this may suggest that their waiver was 
sufficiently informed. For instance, whether Mr Brett received legal training in the past, or had 
researched the legal issues online, could be matters that a court should inquire into. On the other hand, 
if Mr Brett was poorly educated, this may suggest his waiver was not informed. Indeed, in the case of 
DH v The Czech Republic, the European Court of Human Rights held that the appellant's waiver of 
their art 14 right to be free from discrimination was not informed.139 Without legal advice, the 
appellants who were poorly educated, were unable to weigh up "all the aspects of the situation and 
the consequences of giving their consent".140 
Finally in relation to the requirement to be informed, a court should inquire into any other relevant 
circumstantial evidence pertaining to when the waiver was entered into. While there is no suggestion 
that Mr Brett had any particular intellectual disabilities141 or was intoxicated at the time the agreement 
was signed,142 these kinds of matters could bring into question whether his waiver was informed. 
Moreover, evidence of correspondence between Mr Brett and the LVVTA's counsel may provide 
insight into whether Mr Brett understood what he was waiving. Whether Mr Brett had expressed 
confusion or hesitation about the agreement, for instance, could be relevant. 
These kinds of factual inquiries would have helped the Court of Appeal to determine whether Mr 
Brett's waiver was adequately informed without the benefit of legal advice. Although not based on a 
complete picture of all of the evidence, this article submits that if this element had been considered 
by the Court, it may have found that Mr Brett's waiver was uninformed. Waivers are complex legal 
matters and without the benefit of legal advice or legal training, Mr Brett would have arguably lacked 
sufficient information to make an informed and appropriate decision about it.143 
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The second requirement for a valid waiver is that it was unequivocal.144 This, too, was not 
considered by the Court in Brett. A right-holder must have made a sufficiently "'clear and unequivocal' 
indication that waiver is intended".145 For this reason, the Court of Appeal in Police v Kohler held 
that "a valid waiver cannot be implied from silence".146 If the Court had applied this element of the 
standard, it would likely have found the waiver to be sufficiently unequivocal. Indeed, the settlement 
agreement explicitly and unequivocally set out Mr Brett's waiver. Given that this element is 
uncontentious on the facts it is arguably understandable that the Court did not consider it. 
Nevertheless, in order to give Mr Brett's waiver the necessary scrutiny, all three elements of the 
validity standard ought to have been explicitly set out and analysed, whether or not a particular 
element was obviously satisfied on the facts. 
The final requirement is that the waiver was voluntary.147 This was the only element of the waiver 
standard considered by the Court in Brett. The voluntary requirement ensures that a waiver was "the 
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker".148 As touched upon the Court, 
if the agreement would be otherwise illegal at law, for example because it was coerced,149 
compelled150 or obtained under conditions amounting to duress,151 this may suggest that the 
contractual waiver was involuntary. Nevertheless, no concerns were raised by the Court about the 
voluntariness of Mr Brett's waiver. Indeed, the Court noted that there was no suggestion that the 
agreement was illegal other than in terms of the NZBORA.152 
Notwithstanding the Court of Appeal's finding as to voluntariness, one fact ignored by the Court, 
but noted by Palmer J in the High Court, was that Mr Brett had abrogated his right under the threat of 
a defamation suit. While Palmer J did not refer to a lack of voluntariness in his decision, he appeared 
to attach importance to the impending legal action when he concluded that he would not have upheld 
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the waiver, had he thought the right to freedom of expression could be waived.153 Indeed, one scholar 
has suggested that legal action may constitute an improper threat.154 
The Court of Appeal's assessment of voluntariness was convincing. In the absence of any evidence 
that Mr Brett's consent was extorted, coerced or compelled, the mere fact that the agreement was 
entered into under the threat of legal action ought not to render it invalid. To find otherwise would be 
to threaten the basis for the many settlement agreements entered into every day. As discussed above, 
there is a strong public interest in upholding such compromises, not only in terms of freeing up court 
resources, but also in mitigating the risks for private litigants.155 
By setting out and analysing the three elements of the waiver standard, this article has 
demonstrated the kind of scrutiny to which Mr Brett's waiver ought to have been subjected to. 
Importantly, it has highlighted that as a result of the Court of Appeal's flawed analysis, it left key 
facts, such as Mr Brett's lack of legal advice, untouched. Ultimately, such gaps in the Court's analysis 
demonstrate the importance of subjecting waivers to proper scrutiny. Waivers express a right-holder's 
choice to surrender a given right and it is critical that the courts ensure that this is in fact their free 
choice. If a waiver of an individual's right to freedom of expression can be recognised without 
consideration given to whether it was sufficiently informed, the protections afforded by the NZBORA 
risk being undermined. 
VI CONCLUSION 
DM Paciocco observed, rightly, that "persons ought not to be deprived easily of fundamental 
rights and freedoms".156 This article has argued that whilst a decision to deprive oneself of one's right 
to freedom of expression should be recognised by the courts, this recognition should not be given 
easily. Courts must ensure that the waiver reflects the right-holder's free choice or otherwise s 3 bodies 
will be allowed to abandon their constitutional commitments too easily.  
In Brett, the Court of Appeal failed to give effect to this notion. This article has submitted that, 
while it was right to find that Mr Brett could waive his right to freedom of expression, the Court's s 5 
approach failed to subject his waiver to proper scrutiny. If the Court had taken a different approach it 
may not have concluded that the waiver was valid. Unfortunately, Mr Brett may in fact have been 
deprived too easily of a fundamental right. 
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